What Does Artificial Life Tell Us About Death? by Gershenson, Carlos
ar
X
iv
:0
90
6.
28
24
v1
  [
cs
.A
I] 
 15
 Ju
n 2
00
9
What Does Artificial Life Tell Us About Death?
Carlos Gershenson1,2,3
1 Instituto de Investigaciones en Matema´ticas Aplicadas y en Sistemas
Universidad Nacional Auto´noma de Me´xico
Ciudad Universitaria
Apdo. Postal 20-726 / Admn No. 20
01000 Me´xico D.F. Me´xico
cgg@unam.mx http://turing.iimas.unam.mx/~cgg
2 Centro de Ciencias de la Complejidad
Universidad Nacional Auto´noma de Me´xico
3Centrum Leo Apostel, Vrije Universiteit Brussel
Krijgskundestraat 33 B-1160 Brussel, Belgium
cgershen@vub.ac.be http://homepages.vub.ac.be/~cgershen
September 21, 2018
Every evil leaves a sorrow in the memory,
until the supreme evil, death,
wipes out all memories together with all life.
–Leonardo da Vinci
One of the open problems in artificial life discussed by Bedau, et al. (Bedau et al., 2000)
is the establishment of ethical principles for artificial life. In particular:
Much of current ethics is based on the sanctity of human life. Research in articial
life will affect our understanding of life and death (...) This, like the theory of
evolution, will have major social consequences for human cultural practices such
as religion. (Bedau et al., 2000, p. 375)
Focussing on our understanding of death, this will depend necessarily on our under-
standing of life, and vice versa. Throughout history there have been several explanations to
both life and death, and it seems unfeasible that a consensus will be reached. Thus, we are
faced with multiple notions of life, which imply different notions of death. However, gener-
ally speaking, if we describe life as a process, death can be understood as the irreversible
termination of that process.
The general notion of life as a process or organization (Langton, 1989; Sterelny and Griffiths,
1999; Korzeniewski, 2001) has expelled vitalism from scientific worldviews. Moreover, there
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are advantages in describing living systems from a functional perspective, e.g. it makes the
notion of life independent of its implementation. This is crucial for artificial life. Also, we
know that there is a constant flow of matter and energy in living systems, i.e. their physical
components can change while the identity of the organism is preserved. In this respect, one
can make a variation of Kauffman’s “blender thought experiment” (Kauffman, 2000): if you
put a macroscopic living system in a blender and press “on”, after some seconds you will
have the same molecules that the living system had. However, the organization of the living
system is destroyed in the blending. Thus, life is an organizational aspect of living systems,
not so much a physical aspect. Death occurs when this organization is lost.
One of the main properties of living organization is its self-production (Varela et al.,
1974; Maturana and Varela, 1980, 1987; Luisi, 1998; Kauffman, 2000). When death occurs,
this self-production cannot be maintained. But is this organization the only thing that is
lost with death?
The notions of life and death have been much related to those of mind, cognition, aware-
ness, consciousness, and soul1. On the one hand, the mind is a property closely related with
life. Some propose that mind and life are essentially the same process (Stewart, 1996; Bedau,
1998). On the other hand, people have speculated since the dawn of civilization on what
occurs with the mind after death.
Life is a process described by an observer (Maturana and Varela, 1987), in first or third
person perspective. When the process breaks, only description in the third person observer
remains. By definition, we can only speak about death from a third person perspective.
What can artificial life add to this discussion? Artificial life simulations (“soft” ALife)
can be seen as opaque thought experiments (Di Paolo et al., 2000), i.e. one can explore
different notions of life and death with them. Robots (“hard” ALife) would also serve this
purpose. Artificial life can help us build living systems to be explored from a third person
perspective in a synthetic way (Steels, 1993). Can we say that “animats” (Wilson, 1985)
have a mind, in the same sense as animals do? If not, is there something missing in the
particular animat, in artificial life, or in the observer? When a digital organism dies (Ray,
1994), what physically changes is the RAM that encoded the organism in bits. When the bits
describing the organization of the organism are erased, the only place where the organism
prevails is in the observer. The same is for robots. The same is for animals. The same is
for humans. If we describe life as an organizational process, and a mind as depending on it
(Clark, 1997), when the organization is lost, the life is lost and the mind is lost.
Certainly, the organization of digital organisms is much easier to preserve than that of
biological ones. Apart from the ease of copying digital information, digital organisms are
generally inhabiting closed environments. Biological organisms face open dynamical environ-
ments that constantly threaten their integrity. i.e. organisms need to make thermodynamical
work (metabolism) (Kauffman, 2000) to maintain themselves. In an open environment such
as the biosphere, where different evolving organisms interact, there is no “best” or “fittest”
organism, since the fitness depends on the dynamic environment. Thus, fitness changes con-
stantly with the environment, since the environment is changed as organisms evolve trying
to increase their fitness. In this context, it can be speculated that there is an evolutionary
1It is quite problematic to attempt to define these, but a vague notion will suffice. In the following,
“mind” will be used in a broad sense that includes also cognition, awareness, consciousness, and soul.
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advantage of death. If there was no death, i.e. if an organism somehow managed to main-
tain its organization indefinitely, evolution would stop. This actually occurs commonly with
digital evolution. In fact, death of digital organisms has been used as a measure to introduce
novelty (Ray, 1994; Dorin, 2005; Olsen et al., 2008).
The organization represented in a species can survive several lifespans, but is subject to
the same pressure as the one just described. The loss of organization gives the opportunity
to new forms of organization to develop.
The development of protocells (Rasmussen et al., 2008) (“wet” ALife) might further con-
tribute to the exploration of the notions of life and death. By chemically producing the
organization resulting in living systems, the non-mystical notion of life reviewed here will
gain further grounds. Additionally, the non-mystical notion of death explored here will have
to be further elaborated. What occurs when a protocell dies? If we can create again a living
system with the same organization, did it die in the first place? We will be able to have
different instantiations of the same living organization, just like we can have different copies
of the same digital organism. Will its death have the same meaning as that of an animal?
One thing to notice in these questions is that in most biological organisms, the organi-
zation lies not only in their genes, but also in their development (epigenesis). Clones can
develop different organizations. The same might occur for protocells and other future “wet”
artificial living systems. However, on the digital side of artificial life, it is easy again to
maintain and reproduce the organization acquired through development (Balkenius et al.,
2001).
What will the future bring? Will there be biological systems closer to digital ones, in the
sense that living information can be maintained and/or reproduced? Probably. How will
this affect death? We will have more control over it. Will this mark an end to evolution?
No, even when some living organization might be more persistant, there will always be new
situations where organisms have to adapt. In any case, the cultural attitudes towards death
most probably will change. This is not suggesting that we will be less touched by it, or
less spiritual towards it. The implication is that we will have a better understanding of the
phenomenon, with a broader scientific basis.
To conclude this philosphical essay, different notions of death will be deduced from a
limited set of different notions of life:
• If we consider life as self-production (Varela et al., 1974; Maturana and Varela, 1980,
1987; Luisi, 1998), then death will the the loss of that self-production ability.
• If we consider life as what is common to all living beings (De Duve, 2003, p. 8), then
death implies the termination of that commonality, distinguishing it from other living
beings.
• If we consider life as computation (Hopfield, 1994), then death will be the end (halting?)
of that computing process.
• If we consider life as supple adaptation (Bedau, 1998), death implies the loss of that
adaptation.
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• If we consider life as a self-reproducing system capable of at least one thermodynamic
work cycle (Kauffman, 2000, p. 4), death will occur when the system will be unable
to perform thermodynamic work.
• If we consider life as information (a system) that produces more of its own information
than that produced by its environment (Gershenson, 2007), then death will occur when
the environment will produce more information than that produced by the system.
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